New Delhi, The Supreme Court on Wednesday agreed to hear a plea filed by a judicial officer against strictures passed by the Delhi High Court directing him to undergo a refresher-training programme in matrimonial laws.
In its verdict passed in November last year, the high court had recorded its strong disapproval of the manner in which the judicial officer of a family court here was adjudicating matrimonial matters.
It had directed that the judicial officer shall undergo an “appropriate and comprehensive refresher-training programme in matrimonial laws, under the aegis of the Delhi Judicial Academy, post-haste, before he adjudicates any further matrimonial matters”.
The plea filed by the Delhi-based judicial officer came up for hearing before a bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta on Wednesday.
“Why did he invite these strictures?” the bench asked the counsel appearing in the court for the judicial officer.
“He is exercising Article 142 powers while sitting as a district judge,” the bench observed.
Article 142 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to pass any decree or order as is “necessary for doing complete justice” in a cause or matter pending before it.
The petitioner’s counsel said the apex court had earlier held that such strictures should not be passed without hearing the person concerned.
The bench issued a notice on the plea and posted it for hearing after four weeks.
When the petitioner’s counsel argued that the high court order should be stayed, the bench said, “We are issuing notice. What more do you want?”
“If we will be satisfied, we will expunge the remarks,” the bench observed, while refusing to stay the high court order at this stage.
The high court had delivered its verdict on an appeal challenging a judgment passed by the judicial officer in a matrimonial case.
“At the very outset, we deem it necessary to record our strong disapproval of the manner in which the judge … has been adjudicating matrimonial matters,” the high court had said.
“We have repeatedly found that he has conflated provisions of distinct and self-contained statutes, each with its own specific procedures and purposes, thereby distorting the statutory framework governing matrimonial disputes,” it had said.
The high court had observed that a judicial officer cannot amalgamate statutory provisions from different enactments in a manner that neither reflects the text of the law nor permits such blending.
“We were, in fact, taken aback to find that the judge relied upon, in the impugned judgment, a provision, section 28A of the SMA , that does not exist on the statute book and on this basis, granted a decree of divorce,” it had said.
The high court had said while making these observations, it remained conscious of the consistent caution advised by the apex court that high courts should ordinarily refrain from making personal remarks against officers of the subordinate judiciary.
“However, the manner in which the family court judge has repeatedly conducted proceedings not only disturbs judicial conscience but also threatens the integrity of the administration of justice,” it had said, while setting aside the judgment passed by the family court.
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